from Canterbury, United Kingdom
Al-Bashir’s regime
Since gaining independence in 1956, Sudan has been ruled by unstable regimes and frequent military takeovers, and it went through a civil war that lasted twenty-two years and led to the independence of South Sudan in 2011. Former president Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir came to power in 1989 in a bloodless coup and had been ruling the country for over thirty years. In 1993, the US blacklisted the regime as an international sponsor of terrorism, and it imposed sanctions in 1997. Al-Bashir is under indictment since 2009 by the International Criminal Court of Justice for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity linked to the in Darfur genocide.
The Sudanese Revolution
Sudan became the protagonist of headlines worldwide back in April due to the large number of protesters fighting against the dictatorial regime of al-Bashir. Protests first started in December 2018 over the rising price of bread and the overall economic crisis, and then culminated in April 2019, with a consolidated anti-authoritarianism protest movement formed by thousands of young Sudanese led by professionals such as doctors and lawyers and university professors. The Sudanese revolution had started.
After various sit-ins in front of the military headquarters where the former president al-Bashir lived, on the 11th of April the army finally toppled the old regime. While at the beginning of the Sudanese revolution the army and the protesters appeared to be on the same side, soon enough it became clear the two parties had different priorities and the general state of euphoria and hope felt by the Sudanese in April quickly faded. The negotiations talks stalled, with protesters wanting to establish civilian rule with democratic elections as soon as possible, and generals looking to preserve their status.
The turning point: a new Arab winter?
An important moment of the Sudanese revolution was on the 3rd of June, when the military brutally crashed the crowd of protesters in Khartoum who had been striking for the past two days against the military. There were hundreds of killings, with corpses thrown into the Nile River and rapings of women, their underwear publicly hanged in the streets. The Sudanese Doctors Association put the death tool at 128. However, numbers are unclear due to the Internet blackout strategically imposed by the Transitional Military Council (TMC) to cover up their violence. UNICEF reported that at least 19 children have been killed and dozens injured since the 3rd of June, with many detained, recruited to join the fighting and sexually abused (UN, 2019).
The Sudanese media are now under the control of the TMC and the Internet blackout is isolating the country. The protest movement is suffering from the lack of social media, the preferred platform for organizing reunions, reaching new supporters, as well as generating international condemnation for the violence of the regime (BBC, 2019). It is now more difficult and expensive to continue with the protests, and the protest movement has become weaker than it was in April. Despite the initial climate of positivity and hope for a democratic Sudan at the national and international level, the Sudanese revolution now appears to be an echo of the Arab Spring of 2011 and in particular of the subsequent Arab winter.
Structural authoritarianism
The TMC is formally led by General Abdel Fattah Burhan, however the de facto ruler of Sudan is General Mohamed Dagalo, also known as Hemeti. The latter is the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the paramilitary militia responsible for the violent repression in Khartoum of the 3rd of June.
General Hamdan has been the enforcer of al-Bashir for years, and the fact that he is now ruling the country has demonstrated how the system of oppression left in place by their former president is still consolidated within the structure of the Sudanese government. Al-Bashir was in fact able to organize, mainly thanks to the wealth from the oil boom in Sudan of the 2000s, a strong ‘spider web’ network of security and military forces around him (Walsh, 2019a). In April, General Hamdan declared his support for the protesters and turned his back on his patron al-Bashir. However, once protesters refused to disperse asking for an immediate transition to civilian rule, General Hamdan replied with brutal violence, in the same style of al-Bashir. Therefore, it is fair to say the Sudanese ousted their dictator but not his regime.
The Janjaweed occupying Khartoum
The RSF led by General Hamdan is formed by roughly 50.000 fighters who are now occupying Khartoum. Citizens refer to these men as the ‘Janjaweed’, the name of the Arab militias that committed violence in Darfur against the ethnic African communities during the 2000s. Back then, General Hamdan was the commander of one of those militias, from which the RSF originated. Therefore, General Hamdan is implicated in the same crimes related to the Darfur genocide of the ousted dictator al-Bashir. Alaa Salah, the young woman protagonist of the viral picture that became the international symbol of the Sudanese revolution back in April, denounces the violence of General Hamdan affirming how Darfur has arrived to Khartoum (Walsh, 2019b).
The international response
On one hand, the UN, the AU, and the Western governments have expressed their concern following the violence of the 3rd of June. Moreover they pressed the military to immediately stop their attacks on civilians. António Guterres called for an independent investigation on the violence on the 3rd of June (UN, 2019b). The members of the Security Council have also emphasized the importance of respecting human rights and ensuring full protection of civilians (UN, 2019c). The United Nations is cooperating with the African Union to ensure a peaceful transition to civilian rule in Sudan, avoiding the intervention of external forces. It is also worth mentioning Ethiopia’s efforts in resolving the crisis with diplomacy.
On the other hand, rulers of Saudi Arabia, UAE and Egypt view the Sudanese revolution as an infectious disease that could spread to their countries, where the Arab Spring of 2011 was either violently repressed or never allowed. Because of this, Saudis and Emiratis have offered three billion dollars in aids to consolidate the power of the military junta. In particular, there are deep power links between the Sudanese military junta and the Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud. Sudan is in fact a major troop contributor to the Saudi-led coalition fighting the war in Yemen. The war has thus made the Sudanese military rich, with patrons in the richer states of the Arab Gulf who are playing out their geopolitical interests following the power vacuum left in the region.
Under the military junta’s perspective
In response to the international condemnation, army generals have tried to justify their actions by delegitimizing the protesters via the national media. General Burhan has said in his address to the nation after the violence of the 3rd of June that elections will be held in 9 months’ time and that civilian negotiators were just as responsible as the military for the delay in agreeing on the future leadership of the country.
General Hamdan defended himself claiming that Western leaders are plotting to undermine him. He believes his power comes from the Sudanese people, and he is now rebranding himself as the saviour of the country, which would have otherwise been lost without him: “the country needs the Rapid Support Forces more than the Rapid Support Forces need the country” (Walsh, 2019c; Tharoor, 2019). He is now busy preparing his political campaign with rallies being held across the country.
The TMC has also said there is an ongoing investigation on the killings of the 3rd of June. In addition, they are taking care of the trial of al-Bashir, who appeared publicly for the first time after being ousted on the 16th of June, putting to bed suspicions among protesters of his escape to a rich Arab Gulf country. However, the ousted dictator is only being charged for corruption charges and not for the more serious charges he faces at the ICC. On this matter, Sudan’s delegate to the UNSC has clarified that Sudan is not a Rome Statute party and therefore it is not obliged towards the Court. He also stressed the independence and effectiveness of Sudan’s judiciary system in taking care of al-Bashir’s trial (UN, 2019d).
The Karthoum process
Since 2014, the EU is cooperating with Sudan in the Khartoum process aimed at countering the human trafficking in the Horn of Africa. The EU has been accused of “hiding” the impact of its funding of the Sudanese government and its paramilitary forces as part of the Khartoum programme (Ahmed, 2019). While the EU denies funding the Sudanese military junta, researchers like the Sudanese Suliman Baldo affirms the process at least indirectly benefits the RSF. This has been deployed by the government to police the borders, despite its history of human rights abuses (ibid, 2019).
The RSF itself has been vocal about its work for the EU, with Hemeti giving various speeches on the merits of the militia in terms of protecting European national security from the fluxes of migrants. However, the EU insists their goal is protecting migrants, rather than reducing the number of those going to Europe. However, this argument is weakened by the reports of migrants being tortured or smuggled by the RSF (ibid, 2019).
Conclusions
The situation in Sudan remains uncertain and critical. The protesters organized the first march since the crackdown on the 30th of June, chanting anti-military slogans like “Burhan’s council, just fall”. Recently the AU and Ethiopia have extended a joint proposal on the basis of which negotiations between the junta and the protesters can hopefully resume. However, the TMC has yet to approve the proposals and protesters refuse to resume talks until the military council signs it (Hussein and Samy, 2019).
However, there is no sign for now of the RSF loosening their grip on Khartoum. Despite the growing anger within the regular army against General Hamdan and his control over the capital, it is unlikely for the military to rebel over his authority. That is why the economic interests existing within the army, the most powerful Sudanese social class made up by deeply corrupted business tycoons. The power of the TMC is also strengthened by the financial support of some of the richest Arab Gulf countries.
In conclusion, Sudan’s road to democracy is endangered by the geopolitical interests of powerful external actors. As well internal problems that will not heal overnight, such as the authoritarian and corrupted social and political structure left in place by al-Bashir’s regime. It is therefore difficult to say whether the Sudanese revolution will evolve into a successful transition to long-lasting democracy or if it will be yet another Arab winter.
Bibliography
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Walsh, D. (2019a). “The Fall of Omar Hassan al-Bashir, the ‘Spider’ at the Heart of Sudan’s Web”.). The New York Times, (online). Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/11/world/africa/omar-bashir-sudan.html (Accessed 27 June 2019).
Walsh, D. (2019b). “Sudan Ousted a Brutal Dictator. His Successor Was His Enforcer.” The New York Times, (online). Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/15/world/africa/sudan-leader-hemeti.html?module=inline (Accessed 27 June 2019).
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Autore dell’articolo*: Laura Mariani, BA Student. at the University of Kent.
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