from Lille, France
Introduction
“We have no more reason to believe that the days of gunboat diplomacy are over than to believe that the threat of force will not be used on land and in the air” (Millar, 1969). The People’s Republic of China (PRC) relentlessly proves Millar right, notably in its enduring rivalry with Taiwan (the Republic of China). The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has repeatedly performed military exercises in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding waters since 1949, the latest occurrence being on August 13, 2020.
The drills are overtly depicted by Chinese officials as warnings to the Republic of China (ROC), “to fight against provocations and protect national sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Taiwan News, 2020). The drills occurred just a day after Alex Azar, U.S. Secretary for Health and Human Services, had begun his four-day official visit to Taiwan, representing the highest-level visit by an American official since 1979, which appears to have provoked Chinese anger.
This article draws on the recent military exercises in the Taiwan Strait to present an analysis of the gunboat diplomacy conducted by the PLA against Taiwan. The origins of the cross-Strait dispute are first outlined to provide a necessary historical contextualization, as well as the U.S.’ role in the dispute. The features of the gunboat diplomacy are then displayed, followed by an assessment of the effectiveness in the context of the Taiwan Strait dispute.
Beginnings of the Taiwan Strait dispute
The relationship between the ROC and the PRC is characterized by enduring rivalry: it has been a continuous, severe dispute ever since 1949. The Taiwan Strait has represented one of the critical tension points of the international systems steadily for the last 7 decades, “revolving between states of limited tension or conflict and generally peaceful and politically acceptable stalemate” (Goldstein, 2002).
Hostilities began as a direct aftermath of the Chinese Civil War. After years of fighting with Mao’s communists, Chiang Kai-shek was defeated in 1949 and exiled to Taiwan with the remnants of his government and some two million Chinese. The Kuomintang (KMT) took control of Taipei and relocated the Republic of China there. Meanwhile, Mao Zedong declared the People’s Republic of China on the mainland. The two Republics claimed to represent the legal and legitimate representation of China and the people, notably for international recognition (Ferhat, 2006). The ROC was considered as the sole legal China until the General Assembly Resolution 2758 was passed in 1971– helped by the context of the Cold War and the anti-communist fever of the Western bloc.
The recent military exercise also displays a major characteristic of the cross-Strait dispute: the role of the U.S and the importance of the strategic triangle between the PRC, the USA and the ROC. Washington has adopted strategic ambiguity as the groundwork for its policy regarding Beijing and Taipei, in order to maintain security for Taiwan but also to continue its relations with China (Wu, 2012). The U.S. is nevertheless committed to Taiwan, as displayed by the military response – like sending guided missile destroyers in August – it deploys when the PRC pushes gunboat diplomacy.
From a legitimacy question to a sovereignty one
After years of authoritarian rule by the KMT, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was founded in 1986 in Taiwan, in opposition with the ruling party. A democratization process began, with the March 1996 presidential election putting a conclusive end to the democratic transition process (Tien and Chu, 1996). A ‘Taiwanization’ process also accompanied the democratization process, to reconstruct the Taiwanese identity which was scattered by years of authoritarian Chinese rule (Horowitz and Tan, 2005).
As a result, the ROC abandoned any velleity to the legitimate and legal representation of China, which inherently modified the nature of the dispute, shifting towards a sovereignty issue.
The PRC regards Taiwan as a Chinese province and an inalienable part of the state, according to the ‘One China Principle’ (which was outlined in the 1992 consensus signed by both republics). Nevertheless, independence leanings are on the increase in Taiwan, as displayed by the victories of the DPP. In 2005, the PRC introduced the Anti-Secession Law, heralding that Beijing will “employ non-peaceful means” to protect its national sovereignty if Taipei claims independence (Embassy of the PRC in the USA, 2005).
The Taiwan Strait dispute has been characterized by deadlock since its beginning, although it appears that incompatibility between the PRC and ROC’s demands has risen. Indeed, Chinese president Xi Jinping is keen on linking “reunification” with Taiwan to the cause of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Chou, 2018). He made it quite clear to Taiwanese during his speech delivered in 2019 at the occasion of the 40th anniversary of issuing Message to Compatriots in Taiwan, stating that “China must be and will be reunified” and that such internal Chinese affairs should not see meddling from foreign nations (XinHua, 2019). On the other side of the Strait, most are in favour of the status quo.
Military exercises conducted by the PLA in the Taiwan Strait in August 2020
A number of different units participated in the drill and shot live ammunition firing drills near Taiwan for 5 days, supposedly to strengthen operational coordination among them. Colonel Zhang Chunhui, spokesperson for the PLA Eastern Theater Command, reported to the state-run newspaper China Daily the exercises as “a necessary move responding to the current security situation in the Taiwan Strait” and said they were “meant to safeguard national sovereignty”. The timing and lack of reference to a scheduled, “routine exercise”, seem to indicate a response to Azar’s visit. Moreover, the spokesman condemned the implication of foreign nations (indirect reference to the U.S.) which threatens stability in the Taiwan Strait by sending “misleading signals to separatist forces”. Zhang claimed the drills were “an unambiguous warning to Taiwan secessionists and the forces behind them” (NHK, 2020).
The military exercises led to increased tensions in the region, notably displaying the strategic Beijing-Taipei-Washington triangle. The U.S. responded to the drills by sending a second guided missile destroyer through the Taiwan Strait on August 30th (Reuters, 2020). Washington also uncovered previously classified commitments taken by the Reagan administration vis-à-vis Taipei called the ‘Six Assurances’, which reaffirm an enduring support regardless of pressure from Beijing (CNN, 2020). The PRC answered by conducting military drills almost simultaneously in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Yellow Sea and the Bohai Gulf, most probably “to showcase the PLA’s ability to carry out major mobilization of forces across multiple sea areas” despite the coronavirus pandemic (South China Morning Post, 2020).
Gunboat diplomacy in the PRC/ROC dispute
The term gunboat diplomacy was born during the 19th century. It was most notably studied by British diplomat and naval thinker James Cable, who defined it as “the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage, or to advert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nations within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state” (Cable, 1981). It is interesting to note that China itself was a victim of Britain’s gunboat diplomacy during the two Opium Wars, which resulted in some of the ‘Unequal Treaties’. The PRC resorts to coercive diplomacy in the Taiwan Strait dispute in order to alter the current status quo.
Beijing began resorting to such military techniques in the first part of the dispute, which culminated in the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s. It was further intensified with the modernization of the defence apparatus initiated by Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernizations in 1978, and later by the junshi geming (Revolution in Military Affairs) of the 1990s (Atesoglu, 2013). Such military and navy modernization allowed the PRC to pursue its gunboat diplomacy.
The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis is another clear example of coercive gunboat diplomacy in the Taiwan Strait dispute. It took place from August 1995 to March 1996, during which “the PLA conducted a series of war games, live fire exercises and missile tests in the vicinity of Taiwan” (Scobell, 2000), after the U.S.A. bestowed a VISA to then Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui. Washington eventually intervened and sent ships. Similar events occurred in 2007, when “the PLA held a surprise combined arms exercise at a new Joint Forces training area on the Shandong Peninsula” (Fisher, 2010), in 2018 and at many more occasions, each time amounting in a warning to pro-independence supporters in Taiwan and their allies.
Is gunboat diplomacy effective in the cross-strait dispute?
The Chinese aim is two-fold: the short-term aim of deterring Taiwan from seeking independence and the long-term objective of maneuvering Taiwan into accepting unification with the PRC (Fisher, 2010). The first aim can be considered as reached, as so far Taiwan continues to accept the status quo and no actual independence request has been filed. Moreover, it is very unlikely that the ROC will formally declare independence as the aftermaths would be too important, both with the clear threat from China to wage war on the ROC according to the 2005 Anti-Secession Law; and with regards to economic outcomes.
Yet, it has not managed to smother independence willingness in Taiwan through the aforementioned military (but also the range of political, social and cultural) pressure and tools. As displayed by the following tab, there is a strong increase in independence willingness (from 12,4% in 1992 to 31,9% in 2016, which is confirmed by Tsai Ing-wen’s reelection. Moreover, the proportion of unification supporters has drastically decreased from 56,9% in 1992 to 15,8% in 2016 (Hsieh, 2017). A majority of the people surveyed by Hsieh are in favour of the continuation of the status quo. The long-term goal of the PRC – unification – appears far from being achieved.
Furthermore, the importance of the U.S. and its commitment to Taiwan (since the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act) despite the strategic ambiguity it adopted for a time is also a limit for effective gunboat diplomacy regarding the unification question. Washington has shown its readiness to send ships when Beijing resorts to military exercises near Taiwan and has committed to protect the island if it was invaded. Yet, the U.S. army and navy are now the only ones that can defeat the PLA and PLAN, and despite the animosity between Beijing and Washington it appears little likely that China will risk war with the U.S.
Author’s own calculation
Conclusion
Enduring rivalry and deadlock have defined relations between the PRC and the ROC for seven decades, initially based on a legitimacy disagreement which has shifted towards a sovereignty dispute. Beijing’s long-term aim is to push towards unification with Taipei, and to do so, regularly resorts to gunboat diplomacy, i.e. military exercises performed by the PLAN near Taiwanese shores. Yet, those military show-offs present limited success, notably because of the role of the U.S. in the Taiwan Strait dispute, which makes it little plausible that the PRC would actually force unification through the PLA.
Relations between Washington and Beijing have gradually declined, worsened by the 2019 trade war, the pandemic and other factors. The notion of a Thucydides Trap that would “ensnare China and the United States in a 21st century conflict” has gained international attention (Misenheimer, 2019), and the Taiwan Strait dispute is one factor that could lead to warfare between the two, notably if Beijing sends the military to Taiwan and Washington responds in kinds.
Bibliography
Academic articles:
Atesoglu H. Sonmez, ‘Economic Growth and Militart Spending in China, Implications for International Security’, (International Journal of Political Economy, vol. 42 no. 2, 2013)
Cable J., Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1979, (Macmillan in association with the International Institute for Strategic Studies, revised edition in 1981),
Chou Chih-Chieh, ‘Contending Notions of the Cross-Strait Status Quo in Taiwan and Across the Strait’ in The China Review, (Vol. 18, No. 3, 2018)
Fisher Jr. Richard D., China’s Military Modernization, (Stanford Security Studies, 2010)
Goldstein S., ‘The Taiwan Strait : A Continuing Status Quo of Deadlock’ in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, (Vol. 15, 2002)
Horowitz S. and Tan A., ‘The Strategic Logic of Taiwanization’ in World Affairs, (Vol. 168, No. 2, 2005)
Hsieh John Fuh-sheng, ‘Cross-Strait Relations in the Aftermath of Taiwan’s 2016 Elections’ in the Journal of Chinese Political Science, (2017)
Millar T. B., The Indian and Pacific Oceans: Some Strategic Considerations, (Adeplphi Paper No. 57, 1969)
Scobell A., ‘Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis’, (Political Science Quarterly, 2000)
Newspaper articles:
CNN, ‘The US is standing firm with Taiwan, and it’s making that point very clear’, 03/09/2020, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/02/asia/china-taiwan-us-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html
Taiwan News, ‘China’s PLA says it’s holding military exercises in and around Taiwan Strait’, 14/08/2020, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3987172
Anti-Secession Law (full text), Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/999999999/t187406.htm
Survey by Global Barometer, ‘How Taiwanese Citizens View Democracy: Change and Continuity in Democratic Attitudes and Values in Taiwan’s Democratic Consolidation’ (2012), http://www.asianbarometer.org/publications/ea7e6be8e81526a6ab2738e30c561c0e.pdf
Autore dell’articolo*: Zoe Duby, esperta di sicurezza internazionale, diritti umani e politiche di sviluppo. Bi-diploma in Politics and International Relations presso l’Università di Kent (Regno Unito) e la Sciences Po, Lille (Francia). BA in Politics and IR presso l’Università di Kent (Regno Unito). Master’s in Strategy, Intelligence and Risk Management presso la Sciences Po, Lille (Francia).
***
Nota della redazione del Think Tank Trinità dei Monti
Come sempre pubblichiamo i nostri lavori per stimolare altre riflessioni, che possano portare ad integrazioni e approfondimenti.
* I contenuti e le valutazioni dell’intervento sono di esclusiva responsabilità dell’autore.
Editor’s Note – Think Tank Trinità dei Monti
As always, we publish our articles to encourage debates, and to spread knowledge and original and alternative points of view.
* The contents and the opinions of this article belong to the author(s) of this article only.