Day Zero in the Drying Republic: Iran’s Water Emergency and Growing Unrest

di Trinità Dei Monti - 7 Gennaio 2026

  Roma, Italia 

 

Iran is facing a multi-front political, environmental, and economic crisis as life becomes unlivable for everyday citizens. A regime that has proven highly resilient to adversity could soon crumble under the weight of these mutually reinforcing crises. The failure of Iran’s security apparatus to prevent direct strikes during the Twelve-Day War or mount consequential retaliatory attacks exposed weaknesses that punctured the regime’s image of strength. Even among staunch supporters, the sharp gap between Tehran’s maximalist rhetoric and its operational capacity became increasingly difficult to ignore. Meanwhile, the collapse of the Iranian currency following the reimposition of economic sanctions has made the cost of living impossible for many. Then on the environmental front, sustained drought and poor resource management has resulted in an intensifying water emergency. Water security sits at the intersection of development, public health, and national security. The ecological crisis is significant enough that Iranian officials are cautioning that the country may soon reach a point of “water bankruptcy” without immediate intervention. Urban residents have increasingly faced water shutoffs and hundreds of rural villages are now completely reliant on water shipments to quench demand, accelerating migration into cities that only further strains fragile water infrastructure. President Masoud Pezeshkian has even suggested relocating the capital away from Tehran to a more hydrologically secure region. With protests unfolding nationwide, the present convergence of mutually reinforcing crises will therefore serve as a critical test of the Islamic Republic’s institutional capacity, revealing how resilient it truly is.

Origins of the Crisis: Demography, Autarky, and Mismanagement

Iran’s present crisis is a result of decades of myopic modernization policies and mismanagement compounded by population growth and climate change. Iran is among the world’s most arid countries, a reality its earliest civilizations learned to survive through sophisticated water management. Ancient Persia engineered qanāt systems to offset these unfavorable conditions and build thriving settlements. In the 20th century, the Pahlavi Dynasty pursued rapid modernization in what was a largely rural and agrarian society, channeling development toward heavy, water-intensive industries such as steel production. These industrial  projects were concentrated in Iran’s arid central plateau, stimulating large-scale internal migration to emerging industrial centers and necessitating substantial water diversion to sustain the regime’s ambitious industrialization drive. While in 1963, the White Revolution introduced land reform policies intended to limit the influence of feudal landlords by redistributing small plots to peasant farmers. Western consultants introduced modern irrigation methods and powerful pumps to drain aquifers beyond natural replenishment rates. Traditional agricultural methods were abandoned in favor of mechanized agriculture, institutionalizing wasteful water practices.

Following the Iranian Revolution, the regime embarked on autarkic initiatives to create a “resistance economy” capable of producing all essential goods domestically, insulating itself from geopolitical and geoeconomic adversity. The nascent government implemented pronatalist policies aimed to promote early marriage and large families, with the legal age for marriage lowered to 9 years old for girls and 12 for boys. These efforts intensified during the Iran-Iraq War as the regime sought to build Ayatollah Khomeini’s envisioned Twenty Million Army. These policies bore fruit in subsequent decades, with the population growing by over 50 percent since 1990, increasing water demand and pressure on agricultural systems. Meanwhile, the regime subsidized agricultural inputs to artificially increase yields, prioritizing crops deemed essential for survival over climate suitability. Subsidized water pricing in tandem with aggressive well-drilling and dam projects lowered production costs and sustained agricultural output. Farmers from arid regions were encouraged to farm water-intensive crops including wheat, rice, and sugar beet with the central government ignoring the sustainability of these practices. Iranian agriculture now consumes 90 percent of the nation’s annual water resources.

Along with uncontrolled water use, Iran’s troubles are inseparable from broader mismanagement and political corruption. This systemic pattern is epitomized by the so-called “water mafia,” a network of politically connected contractors who exploit water resources for profit. Influence peddling has allowed a small circle of elites to enrich themselves by undertaking infrastructure projects with minimal oversight. Since the revolution, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has consolidated authority across political, economic and security domains, virtually becoming a state within a state by controlling major industries and wielding considerable influence. In 1992, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani created Khatam al-Anbiya and the Sepasad (the Dam Corps) within the IRGC to aid in construction and development initiatives. The IRGC has undertaken aggressive dam construction, taking inspiration from the Chinese development model that Rafsanjani greatly admired. The regime elite sought to accrue the political capital associated with the completion of ambitious infrastructure projects. These projects provided employment for Iran–Iraq War veterans while delivering highly visible infrastructure projects that bolstered regime legitimacy. Operating in tandem with the regime-linked Mahab Ghodss consulting firm, Sepasad has lobbied Parliament to secure blank-check financing for large-scale dam and development projects. This corrupt partnership exploits development initiatives by undertaking overpriced projects with virtually no safeguards against environmental damage. Over the past three decades, Iran has constructed roughly 600 dams, accelerating groundwater depletion, increasing evaporation losses, and reducing downstream flows in one of the driest countries on the planet.

The construction of the Gotvand Dam in Khuzestan is emblematic of the systemic corruption behind the water crisis. The project ran $1.8 billion over budget after ignoring the site’s geological unsuitability and expert warnings of ecological disaster. As a result, the downstream flow of the Karoon River has been contaminated with toxic levels of salt, devastating biodiversity and transforming 370,000 hectares of arable land into virtual “salt flats.” Worsening agricultural conditions have forced local Arab Ahwazi farmers to migrate to larger cities, increasing pressure on urban infrastructure and flaring ethnic tensions with predominantly Persian city-dwellers. This pattern is visible across the nation, with ill-advised infrastructure projects devastating local ecology and negatively impacting local communities. Experts have suggested decommissioning up to 500 dams to prevent continued ecological damage. The city of Yasuj in southern Iran witnessed protests in November 2025, with residents criticizing the construction of the Khersan 3 and Mandegan Dam projects. After the projects began without any official permits and expert warnings of environmental disaster, demonstrators outside the regional governor’s office chanted with one video capturing an individual addressing President Pezeshkian directly, shouting, “God damn you! Come out and answer us!”

Dams, Development, and Disaster

Tehran’s mounting water crisis further reflects the interaction of climatic stress and infrastructural mismanagement. Historically, Persian cities were established at the base of mountain ranges to source water from seasonal snowmelt. The increased water demands of a burgeoning population, combined with shifting climatic conditions have undermined this traditional relationship. Declining precipitation has decreased streamflow and lowered reservoirs to historic levels. At the same time, average annual temperature has increased by 1.7°C since 1990. Extreme hot weather has accelerated evaporation and depleted storage reserves. These environmental pressures are compounded by poor planning and rapid, unregulated urban expansion. Informal settlements sprawling beyond urban boundaries of Tehran have increased demand while compromising water systems. Deteriorating infrastructure represents a solvable but neglected problem, with regime insiders estimating that roughly 35 percent of Tehran’s water is lost through “leaky pipes.” The result is that the capital is increasingly reliant on overstressed aquifers as surface water resources disappear. The Latian and Karaj Dams north of Tehran now sit at historically low capacity, with many reservoirs nationwide reaching “dead storage,” where water is no longer usable for supply or power generation. Officials acknowledge that 19 major dams across the nation are below the 20 percent capacity threshold.

The confluence of these factors result in the remarkable shrinkage of water resources. Most emblematically, once the largest lake in the Middle East, Lake Urmia in northwest Iran has receded by up to 90 percent. Experts cite the siphoning of water for agricultural use, years of consecutive drought, and dam construction on tributary rivers as key factors in converting the lake into a dry salt flat. As the lake has receded, so too have the livelihoods it once supported. Local economies built around tourism, transport, and agriculture have withered alongside the shrinking lake surface. In 2022, local residents took to the streets, blaming government policies for ecological deterioration and chanting, “Lake Urmia is dying, parliament orders its killing.” Lake Urmia’s dramatic shrinkage (pictured in Figure X) is demonstrative of systemic water governance failures, illustrating how climate stress, unchecked infrastructure, and agricultural overextraction have converged to produce nationwide water insecurity. As a reactive measure, in 2025, Iranian authorities began cloud seeding over the lake basin, dispersing chemical agents into clouds in an effort to artificially induce precipitation. Though partially successful, experts warn that while the process can “squeeze out a few more drops,” it certainly cannot solve an endemic problem, especially when underlying mismanagement is not addressed.

It is important to recognize that ecological systems are deeply interconnected, often in ways that are less visible than many realize. When lake beds run dry and reservoirs are drained, tapping into groundwater becomes a last resort, not without consequence. This can lead to land subsidence where the ground surface sinks due to removal of underground support. Excessive withdrawal from depleted aquifers means that Iran boasts among the worst land subsidence in the world. Most severely, near the city of Rafsanjan, the ground level is dropping by over 34 centimeters per year. Land subsidence in the capital results in entire neighborhoods sinking by up to 30 centimetres per year, posing a serious threat to infrastructure, particularly to informal settlements on the city outskirts. Corrupt permit processes or otherwise poor construction standards further render the structural integrity of many buildings lackluster to begin with. Sinkholes can consume buildings and roads, damage utilities, disrupt transportation networks and render previously habitable areas unsafe. These highly visible collapses serve as stark reminders of an environmental crisis decades in the making, quite literally compromising the ground on which the regime stands.

As the drought-stricken nation entered the wettest months of the year, without the expected precipitation, clerics and religious officials organized rain prayers nationwide. Certain religious officials cast drought and shortages as divine retribution for alleged moral deviance, advocating for stricter moral policing. Leading a Friday Prayer in Qazvin, Ayatollah Hossein Mozaffari called for Iranians to embrace modesty and traditional virtue to bring rain: “The prayer for rain is an opportunity for hearts to return to God, to repent for shortcomings, and to recall hope and humility.” By late November, rain and snowfall returned to many regions, appearing to answer these appeals and offering a temporary reprieve. Iranians shared videos on social media, celebrating the rainfall and declaring that their prayers had been answered. Yet with the reprieve, lies a more troubling reality. Experts noted that climate change has intensified the seasonal precipitation cycle, compressing it into shorter and more extreme bursts. Major flooding events occurred in Kerman, Fars, Hormozgan, Khuzestan, Bushehr, and Sistan-e-Baluchestan. Environmental journalist Roozbeh Eskandari argues that decades of poor environmental management have compressed the soil and stripped the land of its capacity to absorb water, now water rushes across the surface, carrying mud and debris, and devastating entire communities rather than replenishing aquifers. Flash flooding, heavy rain, and overflowing rivers have resulted in numerous deaths. The Iranian Red Crescent Society reports that nine people went missing on December 29th due to flooding in Khuzestan, Boyer Ahmad, and Kohgiluyeh. What initially appeared to be a long-awaited blessing has instead exposed a more concerning truth: rainfall alone is no longer sufficient to salvage a profoundly mismanaged ecosystem.

Water Protests and State Repression

Environmental stress threatens to deepen long-standing ethnic and cultural divides, which the regime has long accused foreign governments of seeking to exploit. Divergent water demands often overlap with broader cultural divides, posing serious threats to social cohesion when residents of rural areas accuse authorities of favoritism by misallocating water. Minority populations in Khuzestan, Lor, and Bakhtiari lament perceived over-allocation to Persian urban centers, echoing historical grievances over economic and political neglect. Forced migration and displacement resulting from climate stress to urban areas further strains city water systems and sets the ground for ethnic tension. In eastern Iran, the impoverished province of Sistan-e-Baluchistan has faced over twenty years of drought, with worsening environmental decline and persistent poverty pushing many Sunni Baluchis to abandon their ancestral homeland. This water stress is intensified by Afghanistan’s dam projects on the Helmand River and by Tehran’s failure to diversify the regional economy, as it continues subsidizing agriculture despite dwindling water resources. Moreover, economic and social marginalization has helped breed separatist violence, as armed groups capitalize on narratives of state neglect and exclusion.

Iran is no stranger to periodic protests, with grievances occasionally erupting into street demonstrations and the regime responding through repression and intimidation. Yet the current protests are the largest since the 1979 Revolution, marking a qualitatively different challenge to the Islamic Republic’s authority. When confronted with heightened domestic pressure, Tehran typically adopts a multi-pronged survival strategy. First, it externalizes blame by framing unrest as the product of foreign interference, internal betrayal, or subversive elements seeking to undermine the Islamic Republic. Dissenters and protest movements are cast as artificial and foreign-backed, a narrative designed to delegitimize their political grievances. In 2022, for example, Iranian officials accused Israel and the United Arab Emirates of “stealing” Iran’s rain through cloud-seeding initiatives. The regime has also offered limited concessions designed to diffuse pressure. Following the 2022 “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, for instance, authorities relaxed hijab enforcement and moral policing to ease discontent. However, these concessions cannot be made in a situation where material factors do not permit it; there is no compromise to be made when there is simply not enough water. More forcefully, the regime has also increasingly responded to water protests and broader social unrest with coercion, relying on repression and intimidation to preserve its authority. There have been attempts to silence journalists against reporting on the water crisis. Local media in Baneh was warned against “spreading public anxiety,” even as neighborhoods went 72 hours without running water. The state has also escalated its use of executions as an instrument of political control, with the Iran Human Rights group estimating that between January 1 and September 23, 2025, at least 1,000 Iranians were executed. The current nationwide protests have met similar responses, with an unknown number of casualties in clashes between demonstrators and security forces. This pattern reflects a regime attempting to compensate for governance failures by externalizing blame and ruling increasingly through fear as its social contract weakens.

Yet, these strategies are not effective in the face of environmental crises where stark material realities belie regime responses. Localized protests over water shortages, including the 2021 “Uprising of the Thirsty,” have erupted as rural agrarian populations confront acute scarcity. However, the geographic expansion of water stress into Iran’s urban core marks a significant shift in the political significance of these protests. Iranian political scientist Amir Chahaki underscores this change: “Previously, Iranians had only heard of water-related protests in southern Iran — in the provinces of Sistan-e-Baluchestan, or Khuzestan. But now, for the first time, water has been cut off in some districts of Tehran. This creates a great deal of fear.” As shortages reach the capital, water insecurity transitions into a national political risk, eroding the regime’s ability to contain localized unrest. Analysts and observers are watching closely, as the prospect of taps running dry in a city of more than ten million residents carries profound implications.

Cracks in the Dam: Looking to the Future

The Islamic Republic has proven remarkably resilient in the face of adversity, repeatedly surviving economic pressure, social unrest, and external threats. Yet Iran now faces a precarious future in which environmental, economic, and political crises are mounting, placing unprecedented strain on the regime’s capacity to govern. Worsening economic conditions over the past year have sharply eroded living standards. In late December, the Iranian Rial collapsed to historic lows while food prices soared alongside inflation. Mass protests sparking in December into January 2026 are growing in intensity and frequency, broadening focus from economic woes into more general anti-regime sentiment.A balanced approach should not minimize the potential for environmental stress to exacerbate political vulnerabilities. Iranian journalist Nik Kowsar highlights how many sites of fervent protest location overlap with areas affected by water shortages over the past year, suggesting that state failures in water governance are translating into popular mobilization. Against this backdrop, Iran’s deepening water crisis emerges not as an isolated environmental challenge but as a multiplier for existing grievances. Shrinking lakes, depleted aquifers, and failing infrastructure are not merely ecological disasters. They are symptoms of cracks in the social contract and highly tangible examples of the state’s inability to provide. While the regime has weathered multiple waves of mass unrest over the decades, the current situation represents the largest and most sustained challenge since the 1979 Revolution. Iran may soon serve as a critical case study in how environmental decline can accelerate broader processes of political fragility and social unrest.

Figure  X – False-color Sentinel-2 L2A imagery (bands 8/4/3) illustrating the condition of Lake Urmia between 2015 and 2025.  Source: European Space Agency (ESA), Copernicus Sentinel-2.

 

 

Bibliografia

 

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Autore dell’articolo: Alessandro Portolano graduated from the University of Connecticut in May 2025 and completed advanced studies in International Relations from Columbia University. He has research experience in international relations and geopolitics. His interests include Middle East dynamics, resource scarcity, and environmental security.

GEOINT contributor: Shikhar Chaturvedi is a senior at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government. His analytic focus includes cultural intelligence, defense analysis, and irregular warfare, with emphasis on multilingual OSINT, GEOINT, and information environments.

 

 

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